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## REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

Untersuchungen über Plato. Die Echtheit und Chronologie der platonischen Schriften von CONSTANTIN RITTER. Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1888.

More than once in this Journal has attention been called to the statistical method which scholars have been applying for the last eight or nine years to the questions of the Platonic canon. Employed for the first time by Dittenberger in a memorable article—Hermes 16, 1881, S. 321–345 (see A. J. P. III 376)—this method has been followed by Frederking,<sup>1</sup> who, however, enters a caveat against premature conclusions (Jahrb. 1882, S. 534–541; see A. J. P. VI 387), by Schanz (Hermes 21, 1886, S. 439–459; see A. J. P. VIII 506), and latterly by Gomperz (see A. J. P. IX 378). The unmetaphysical mind, perhaps even the metaphysical mind, grown weary of the endless football game in which each player has a different goal, is now-a-days inclined to acquiesce in any plan that seems to promise positive results, even of the most modest character. The solution of the problem as sought by historical data, by the development of thought is almost hopeless, if we are to judge by the divergent order of the Platonic dialogues as laid down by the different scholars who have occupied this field of research. If we put the short dialogues first, who is our surety that Plato did not amuse his riper years with essays for less advanced students? Do we not find great scholars of our own day, after a reputation made by abstruse researches, turn to the preparation of elementary manuals? And as to the contents, do we not know that Baur preached one thing to his village congregation and taught another thing from his chair at Tübingen? Do we make ardor and swing the test of style? Nothing is so perilously like a young man's fervor as an old man's fervor—and has it not been said of Pindar that he returned in his old age to the manner of his youth? The various estimates of the time when the Phaedrus was composed—estimates made by men admirably qualified to judge by reason of sympathy, of feeling for style—go ludicrously far apart, and Parmenides, which is generally put late, has been put early, and finally turned out of the Platonic canon altogether. No sooner do

<sup>1</sup> Grundsätzlich stellt sich Frederking übrigens auf denselben Boden wie Dittenberger; nur verlangt er eine weitere Ausdehnung der grammatisch-stilistischen Bemerkungen. So Ritter, S. 60 (note), who finds that of Frederking's proposed tests *μῶν, τε* without a corresponding particle and parenthetic *εἶπον* = *inquam* (*εἶπεν, εἶπέν*), two, *μῶν* and *εἶπον* as characteristic of a younger stratum are very valuable. Roeper's theory that in his earlier authorship Plato used the dual with moderation, then gradually abandoned it, and finally returned to the employment of it with more freedom than ever, does not meet with much favor at Ritter's hands, and it must be acknowledged that the stylistic conditions of the dual vary so much that it is perilous to build any conclusion on the varying occurrence. One thing Roeper has shown in his highly interesting and valuable monograph, that Plato's use of the dual generally is largely artificial, as may be seen by the categories employed. This indication of a conscious working with the elements of style is of great importance in the estimate of Plato's authorship, and for the study of antique methods of composition in general.

we speak of a substantial agreement as having been reached than some authoritative voice forbids the banns, and the average scholar picks up each new contribution to the controversy of the canon with a sigh that is almost as doleful as that which rises from the *Malebolge* of the Homeric question. From the statistical method one can at least learn a little Greek, and to those whose business it is to teach Greek, that is a matter of some interest and importance. To be sure, most persons will not be satisfied with that incidental good, and those who have got into the habit of decrying the dreary statistical method will ridicule results that are based on tables of particles. But to any one who has faithfully applied the statistical method and kept his mind open to the many cross influences that are always to be considered in drawing the final inferences, there is no author in the range of Greek literature to whom that method may be more fitly applied than Plato. We have in the corpus of his works the documents of a very long career through which it seems impossible for any human being to have passed without marked changes, and the human being whom we have to consider was, with all the serenity of his temper, a true artist in the mobility of his genius. My friend, Professor Shorey, thinks me rather fanciful in connecting Plato's peculiar use of  $\tau\epsilon$  in the *Timaios* with the Lokrian origin of *Timaios* himself.<sup>1</sup> This is not more fanciful than the notion that Xenophon, not to be mentioned as an artist in the same breath with Plato, is given to similar dialectic touches (see Simon, *Jahrb.* 1888, S. 746 *à propos* of  $\acute{\alpha}\chi\rho\iota$ ), and even Professor Shorey does not decline to recognize the movement imparted to the great prose poem by the epic use of the particle. Now this mobility, which is readily recognized in special deviations, such as the one cited above, must have manifested itself under certain streams of influence—removed from the author's own ken, and hence indefinitely more valuable to us as indices of development; and it is in these tricks of speech, acquired and dropped, that we are to look for guidance as to chronology. Of course, whenever intent comes in, we must suspend our research and seek another set of causes, and all along we must bear in mind the artistic conditions of each dialogue. Mere frequency is not a safe test; it must be controlled by the sphere.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See my note on *Ol.* IX 43 and Professor Shorey's remarks *A. J. P.* IX 410 (note). My observation was made independently of Frederking (*l. c.* 537). Oddly enough, according to Frederking, the greatest relative frequency of this use of  $\tau\epsilon$  (combining single words) is found, outside of *Timaeus* and *Critias*, in the *Laws*, a work in which another Lokrian is said to have had a hand.

<sup>2</sup> Zeller, in the last ed. of his *Philosophie der Griechen* (Zweiter Theil, Erste Abtheil. 1889), which has just come to hand, will not grant to the statistical study of Plato's language the determining voice in the investigations as to the chronology of the Platonic writings. He admits the postulate, as to the change in Plato's style (p. 512), but contends, as Frederking has done, that the range of observation is too narrow. He does not appreciate or does not concede the importance of the categories already investigated. Hundreds of words and phrases must be statistically fixed, inflexion, periodic structure, hiatus, inversion, etc., etc. All these things together give to the style of an author its form and pressure, and it only when his writings show a steadily progressive change in all these directions that we can determine thereby the chronological succession. And then he goes on to emphasize the cross currents, the changes due to popular or scientific treatment, to rhetorical or artistic character, the frame of the author's mind, external occasions, the recent reading of books, the resumption of previous writings or sketches, all the various unseizable influences that determine the association of ideas in language. In order to get one's bearings in such an investigation the true plan would be to experi-

And now we turn to the book that has called forth these remarks, Constantin Ritter's *Untersuchungen über Plato*, in which the author has gathered up the results of the statistical inquiries of Dittenberger and others and has added new material of his own.<sup>1</sup> As to the method itself he has no doubts. He considers this road to be built on solid ground that cannot be moved, and puts aside objections that are raised on the score of accident and arbitrariness. Such objections come from those who have never engaged in an investigation such as this.

The first observation pertains to *ὁῖλον ὅτι* and *ὁῖλον ὥς*. According to Ritter's count *ὁῖλον ὅτι* occurs 14 times in the Laws as against 16 examples of *ὁῖλον ὅτι*, a startling statement on general principles, for, in making the needful distinction between *ὅτι* and *ὥς*,<sup>2</sup> and pointing out the combinations in which that distinction is not dormant, the vast prevalence of *ὁῖλον ὅτι* is rightfully insisted on, and this is the case in most of the Platonic dialogues. Indeed, most of them know nothing of *ὁῖλον ὥς*. The Rpb. has only 2 (366 D and 370 B), and 47 passages with *ὁῖλον ὅτι*. In VIII 550 D *ὥς* is 'how,' as Ritter points out. In the Polit. twice (10 δ. δ.), Philebus 5 times (8 δ. δ.), Soph. 8 (10 δ. δ.), Tim. 4 (1 δ. δ.), Critias once (no δ. δ.).

*σχεδόν* is very common in the Laws. In the Republ. *σχεδόν* : *σχεδόν τι* (or *σχεδόν . . . τι*) :: 7 : 12, and in the other dialogues *σχεδόν* generally has *τι*, but in the Soph. (26), Phileb. (14), Polit. (13), Tim. (9), the bare *σχεδόν* occurs often.

The use that Dittenberger has made of the occurrence of *τί μὲν*; *γε μὲν*, *ἀλλὰ μὲν* is well known (see the passages already cited). These particles are wholly wanting in some of the Platonic dialogues, and all abound in Laws, Phileb., Polit., Sophistes, and it may be added that D.'s results have been confirmed and further inferences drawn by Gomperz in the article to which reference has been made, and of which Ritter had, indeed most likely could have had, no knowledge. Gomperz arranges the Platonic dialogues into two groups according to the entire absence of all three combinations or the presence of all or

ment with writings the date of which is known, as, for instance, the writings of Goethe, and I would add to these very disillusioning words of Zeller that until this is done and done satisfactorily, there will always be cavil at the method. Ritter says that an examination of a modern author would doubtless yield similar results (p. 28), but who would not prefer trial to assertion? At the same time much can be urged in favor of the special line of observation followed by Ritter and his predecessors, inasmuch as it runs chiefly along the unconscious elements of style.

<sup>1</sup> Professor Lewis Campbell, himself the first, in his edition of the *Sophistes*, to make large use of the element of language in determining the later group of Platonic dialogues, has naturally taken a deep interest in Ritter's researches, which he has manifested by a notice in the *Classical Review*, III, p. 28, and in an article in the *Transactions of the Oxford Philological Society*, 1888-9, p. 25 foll.—an article which appears expanded in the new *Bibliotheca Platonica*, ed. by Thos. M. Johnson, Osceola, Mo., Vol. I, p. 1 foll. 'When minor differences and uncertainties are discarded,' he says, 'there remains a strong consent of evidence in favor of placing Soph., Polit., Phileb., Tim., Critias, Leges in a separate group,' and 'Ritter shows also some grounds for grouping Phaedr., Theaet. (Parm.), Republic.' The resemblance of Phaedr. to the later manner is accounted for by the fact that 'Plato is caught by a fascination at which he himself is laughing all the while.' 'These peculiarities are but the decorations of a sort of carnival dress that is worn for this occasion only,' but the Plato who came to scoff remained to pray at the shrine of rhetoric, and we witness a 'gradual prevalence over Plato's style of the rhetorical artificiality which in the earlier periods he had alternately ridiculed and coquetted and played with.'

<sup>2</sup> A. J. P. VI 487. The frequency of *ὁῖλον ὥς* in the *Sophistes* struck me years ago.

any one of them, brings into the range of his consideration some of the dialogues omitted by Dittenberger, and corrects D. here and there. To be sure, the Rpb. has its share (.50 to the page), and Phaedrus is not exempt, but Politicus, Sophistes, and Philebus stand out boldly, all three being about .90 to a page, while the Laws falls below the average of the Rpb. for reasons that can readily be understood. (For the statistics see Gomperz l. c. p. 23.) Other criteria observed by Dittenberger are the occurrences of *καθάπερ* and *ὥσπερ*, of *ἔως*, *ἔωσπερ* and *μέχριπερ* and of *τάχ' ἂν ἴσως*, all confirmatory of the common character of the four dialogues mentioned, and all serving to draw the Timaeus and the Critias into the same stadium of Plato's authorship.

Schanz's groups of tests consist of *τῷ ὄντι*, *ὄντως*, and of *ἀληθῶς*, *ὡς ἀληθῶς*, *ἀληθεία* and *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*, according to which Leges, Philebus, Polit. and Tim. form a special group among the Platonic writings. Sophistes is pushed further back because of the allusion in Polit. to the methods of the Soph. (*διαίρειν κατ' εἶδη*), which allusion involves a certain lapse of time. But so far as the language is concerned the dialogue belongs to the same general group of late compositions, though it may be early among the late.

Other earmarks of later origin are *μακρῶ* and *μυρίῳ*, which occur occasionally with comparative and superlative instead of the consecrated *πολύ* and (with the comp.) *πολλῷ*. *μακρῶ* occurs 4 times in the Laws, twice in the Rp.,<sup>1</sup> twice in the Phileb., once apiece in Theaet. and Tim. *μυρίῳ* twice in the Laws, once each in Phileb., Polit., Rpb. VII 520 C. For strengthening the superlative *ὥς*, *ὅτι*, *ὡς ὁλόν τε*, *εἰς* and *κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*, *εἰς* and *κατὰ δύναμιν*, and *ὡς δυνατόν* are all employed, but *εἰς δύναμιν* and *κατὰ δύναμιν* very often in the Laws and noticeably often in the supposed later group. *χρεῶν ἔστι* for *χρή* swarms in the Laws, and in the same work *πρέπον ἂν εἴη* is preferred to *πρέποι*.<sup>2</sup> In the Laws *κάλλιστος* is often strengthened by *ἄριστος*; a peculiarity shared by Tim., one example being found in Phaedr. 257 A and one in Symp. 199 A. In the Laws *τὰ νῦν* occurs with disproportionate frequency, and in the same work *πότερον* and *πότερα* vary according to the principle of avoidance of hiatus, though elision would have made *πότερα* inoffensive in that regard.<sup>3</sup>

Old is the observation of the frequency in the Laws of the datives in *-οισι*

<sup>1</sup> Ritter's figures are IX (5) 58 E and (5) 78 B. 558 E is not in Bk. IX and the reference is wrong. Ast supplies another *μακρῶ*, Rpb. V 461 E.

<sup>2</sup> This is a part of the fondness for periphrases so noticeable in the Laws. I began a collection many years ago, but soon had enough for my immediate purpose, the use of the periphrastic perfect opt. with *ἂν*. Any one who will look at Professor Alexander's paper on Participial Periphrases in Attic Prose (A. J. P. IV 291-308) cannot fail to be struck with the frequent occurrence of the Laws in his citations. As Ritter says: *χρεῶν ἔστι* verhält sich zu *χρή* ganz wie *πρέπον ἂν εἴη* zu *πρέποι ἂν* u. wir bemerken hier eine *Schwerfälligkeit u. Umständlichkeit* des Ausdrucks, welche ich für den *späteren Stil* Platos geradezu *kennzeichnend* finde (S. 74). That these periphrases, however, are not all to be put into the same category, and that something has to be granted to the sphere as well as to the period, will be abundantly evident to those who have read Alexander's article.

<sup>3</sup> Blass, Att. Beredsamk. II 426, notices a special avoidance of hiatus in Phaedrus, Laws, Philebus, Sophistes, Politicus. In the Phaedrus he attributes it to the influence of Isocrates on a dialogue in which Isocrates is complimented, and not necessarily to the later date of composition. The others fall under the general rubric of speeches and not real dialogues (Plato's spätere Dialoge nähern sich übrigens zum Theil auch schon in der äusseren Form der Kunstrede).

and -αισι.<sup>1</sup> The exact number is given by Ritter, 85 in all, the mass of them in the latter six books.

There is a great variety in the formulae which refer to what has been said before, e. g. ὡς λέγω, ὥσπερ ἔλεγες, καθάπερ ἔλέγετο, ὅπερ εἶπομεν, ὧν εἴρηκα, ὃ εἴρηται, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη. διήλθον, διελήλυθα and διήμην also occur. But the imperfect forms are most common, Rpb. 43, Gorg. 19, and in some dialogues they are used exclusively, as in the Euthyd. (7), whereas in the Laws the imperfect forms retreat and the forms of εἶπον come to the front, and the same is true of Criti., Phileb., Polit., Soph., Tim. In the same group εἴρηται is used. Leg. (11), Tim. (3), Polit. (3), Soph. (1), Theat. (1), Phaedr. (1); ἐρρήθη occurs Leg. (8), Criti. (2), Phileb., Soph., Tim., Theat., Rpb. once each. Elsewhere lacking.<sup>2</sup>

τάχ' ἰσως occurs only in later dialogues, according to Dittenberger; Ritter adds the observation that in the later dialogues τάχα varies more frequently with ἰσως than in the earlier dialogues and occurs oftener. In the majority of the dialogues τάχα : ἰσως :: 1 : 10; in the Laws, Phileb., Polit., Soph. 1 : 2.

All the writings of Plato have the form of dialogues, but in some of them the dialogue has a mere name to live. So in the Tim., the Critias. In some of them, as in the Sophistes, the many questions only serve to mark the heads and the progress of the dialogue, a surrogate for the rhetorical *propositio* and *partitio*, or, to put it in Grote's way, the dialogue of this class 'includes no antithesis nor interchange between two independent minds, but is simply a didactic lecture put into interrogatory form and broken into fragments small enough for the listener to swallow at once, he by his answer acknowledging the receipt.' Very different is the case with other dialogues in which there is true dramatic action, and though Sokrates' opponents are often but quintains, quintains hit back and many of them are living personages. Now in making an estimate of the recurrence of such dramatic formulae as τί μὲν Ritter has seen that the mere counting by pages will not suffice. This has been done by Dittenberger, and as a preliminary is thankworthy, but if we are to get to the bottom, we should have to count all the equivalent formulae, all the opportunities of use, and take the proportion of each actually employed. It is no wonder that Ritter has declined to enter on this tedious and difficult research, and has contented himself with observing the more common formulae employed in answers, with the result that certain formulae, ἔγωγε, οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἐμοίγε, ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ, δοκεῖ μοι, with their negatives do not occur a solitary time in the Laws with 569 formal answers.

It is not my purpose in this paper to give all the details of Ritter's investigations. Suffice it to emphasize the statement which he makes on p. 26 that there are no less than thirty points in which Laws, Philebus, Polit., and Soph.

<sup>1</sup> It is not surprising to find these datives in the Laws, which might well be supposed to be influenced by the old legal style (see Meisterhans, <sup>2</sup> p. 94). 'Stallbaum tries to account for this by the nature of the subject and by the gravity of phrase belonging naturally to a book on legislation. But this feature is present more or less in all the six dialogues.' Campbell, *Bibl. Plat.* p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Some three years ago Dr. Geo. B. Hussey, then a Fellow of the Johns Hopkins University, while engaged in a most laborious study of Plato's use of continued metaphor was led to investigate this very point of Plato's use of the verbs of saying, and the matured results of this investigation are presented in a paper read in the summer of the current year (1889) before the American Philological Association and published in the present number of the A. J. P.

show a common difference from the majority of the Platonic dialogues. The greater part of these points pertain to the formulae for question and answer, and of course these have little scope in the *Tim.* and none at all in the *Critias*. But in the other peculiarities *Tim.* shares, such as the more frequent occurrence of (1) *γε μήν*, (2) *καθάπερ*, (3) *μέχριπερ*, (4) *ὅντως*, (5) *ἀληθῶς*, (6) *ὁγλον ὡς*, (7) *σχεδόν*, (8) *εἰς* and *κατὰ δύνανται*, (9) *τὰ νῦν* or *τὸ νῦν*, (10) *εἰρήται* and *ἐρρήθη*. Then *Tim.* has certain peculiarities in common with the *Laws*, and the language of *Critias* and *Tim.* is essentially the same.

In pressing home his argument Ritter dismisses almost cavalierly the thought of accident, and does not show much more consideration for the other notion that Plato, in order to bring about an external connexion between an earlier and a later piece, deliberately revived an abandoned manner, though he does admit the possibility of such a rejuvenescence in a few details, and in my judgment it is well that he does so. Plato was after all a conscious artist. But most of these changes are unconscious, and towards the close of his career Plato could not have written in his earlier manner without painstaking and tedious studies, such as modern observers are now making as to Plato's style. Indeed, Plato would not have been the genius that he was if he had thus laboriously mimicked his former self without any important object. True, one might cite against Ritter the famous sneer of Dionysios at Plato for combing and curling his dialogues to the end of his days, but this is worse than combing and curling, and few will believe that Plato saved up, as some of our modern ladies do, all the hairs that had dropped from his dialogues in those long years and made of them new locks for the dialogues of his old age.

Ritter, then, considers it as settled that *Laws*, *Philebus*, *Polit.*, *Soph.*, *Timaeus* and *Critias* form a special group among the Platonic writings and belong to the last stadium of Plato's authorship. He now applies the same method to *Rpb.*, *Phaedrus*, and *Theaet.* Of 40 points in language which are noticeable for their joint occurrence in *Laws*, *Phileb.*, *Polit.*, *Soph.*, and so far as opportunity offers in *Tim.* and *Critias* also, 24 occur in the *Rpb.*, 20 in *Theaet.*, 18 in *Phaedrus*, 6 in *Phaedo*, 4 in *Cratylus*, 4 in *Laches*, and one apiece in *Charmides*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, *Euthydemus*, and *Gorgias*. One apiece does not count, and ought not to count, and Ritter considers himself justified in making a second class out of *Phaedrus*, *Rpb.* and *Theaet.*—though it might be remarked that if proportion has anything to do with it the *Rpb.* should be put first. But the *Rpb.* suggests at once the question whether this statistical method gives any support to the familiar theory that the *Rpb.* was not composed at one jet, and that the work is made up of different groups composed at greater or less intervals. This is a view that goes back to K. F. Hermann, that has been advocated by Krohn, Siebeck, Schanz, Pfeleiderer, a consensus that is of the more importance because these scholars get at their result for the most part by different roads—Schanz taking the very road that we are now pursuing. But Ritter's observations point to an extraordinary agreement as to usage in all the details to which so much importance has been attached during the whole investigation. And with the exception of the first book, which stands by itself in respect of certain usages, there is in his view no such diversity as would entitle us to accept the theory of a long interval between the parts of Books II–X. This will be unwelcome news to some Platonic scholars, who would rather abandon the whole method of statistical research than give up the

seductive theory of a break or breaks in the composition of the Rpb. Of course there will not be lacking those who will endeavor to reconcile the science of statistics and the religion of a favorite theory, but Ritter refuses to regard such attempts with favor. It may have been that Rpb. was published in different sections, the first extending to V 471 A, and an interval of some years may have elapsed before the publication of the rest, and Bk. X is unquestionably an appendix, as is shown both by form and contents; but even if Bks. II-IX were written continuously, Ritter does not think that a long time was necessary for the completion of this last book, which the author may have considered an appropriate close to the whole.

Ritter's interesting chapter on the character of the language of the spurious and doubtful writings found in the Platonic corpus must be despatched in a brief summary. It is hardly worth while to waste time on Axiochus and Halcyon. Demodocus is condemned by the *εἶπε* test. Sisyphus has caught 'the Platonic coloring,' as Hermann remarked, though it is open to objections on lexical grounds. Eryxias, a good imitation of Plato's style, shows a mixture of earlier and later formulae, to say nothing of the vocabulary. *περὶ ἀρετῆς* and *περὶ δικαίου* are true to the earlier manner except in a few points. Alcibiades II, so far as Ritter's tests go, might be put towards the end of the first series of the Platonic dialogues, but it is hopelessly wrecked on the vocabulary. Alcibiades I represents a later Platonic manner than Alcibiades II, and if it were by Plato, would occupy a position between Symp. and Theaet. In the *Anterastae* there is a jarring between earlier and later formulae, but the Hipparchus has followed the characteristics of the earlier period so closely that Ritter thinks something may be said for its genuineness. The *Epinomis* differs so little from the *Laws* in the categories here considered that from this point of view Ritter considers it hard to upset the antique theory that Plato himself had added it as an appendix to the *Laws*, though he thinks that the evidence of the contents is against the Platonic authorship, and Philip of Opus, our Lokrian friend, is made to bear the responsibility of this achievement. Clitophon belongs to the later range and cannot have been the sketch of an introduction to the Rpb. Theages shows the cloven foot at the very end, in 131 A *εὐχαῖσι*, and Minos has too many *val's* and too few *πάνυ γε's*. Io, the contents of which would lead us to class it among the early dialogues, must be put late, if we accept Ritter's tests, and the use of *τί μὲν*; (331 D) as a real question is un-Platonic, while Hippias I, Hippias II, and Menexenus pass muster among the earlier pieces, except that Hippias II has too many *val's*, though Ritter would not on that account alone put it into the same category with Minos. If *Lysis* is genuine it belongs to the end of the first series, and is by no means the first piece of Plato's, as Hermann has maintained on the ground of the story in D. L. III 35, that Sokrates had heard *Lysis* read aloud.

Of especial interest is the way in which the *Parmenides* responds to the tests set up by Ritter and others. One set shows that it cannot belong to the first stadium, but the phenomena of the third are so sparingly represented that we are tempted to class it with the second, with *Phaedrus*, Rpb., *Theaet.* But here again there seems to be no place for the unlucky dialogue, and the piece presents other puzzling variations. In any case the defenders of its genuineness must, according to Ritter, be satisfied with a position not later than *Sophistes*, not earlier than any of the first series. *Epistle VII*, longest and



most important of all, is excluded from the list of the genuine Platonic epistles on the ground of its contents, but as the *Epinomis* is probably written by a personal pupil of Plato's, who observed and imitated the manner of the aged master, so in the seventh epistle we have a similar phenomenon, and Ritter goes so far as to suppose that the writer may have made use of Plato's own notes.

How far do these observations in regard to the form correspond with results that are to be gained from the contents? The 'development of doctrine' which has been claimed for Plato in the theory of ideas, in the conception of the soul, ought to furnish corroboration for the results of the statistics, which we have been considering. But Ritter agrees with Hirzel in thinking that the tripartite division of the soul in Plato is only rhetorical to begin with, and that the 'developed theory of ideas' and the stages of its development are among the things that are yet to be made out. Nor does Ritter attach much importance to Plato's shift of views in regard to ἀρετή, in regard to ἔργος. References from one dialogue to another, such as Zeller has traced and Siebeck has made it his special business to run to earth, are deceptive, as the one scholar openly and the other virtually admits. If the promise of *Protag.* 357 B is fulfilled in *Polit.* 283 D, of *Protag.* 361 D in *Meno* and *Gorgias*, of *Charmides* 169 D in *Theaetetus*, it by no means follows that *Laches* is later than *Rpb.* IV 430 C—to the confusion of all statistics of language, it is true, but not less to the confusion of all theories of Platonic development. What is to prevent Plato from making a dramatic use of an earlier dialogue? Certainly no considerations of anachronism, to which he shows himself everywhere celestially superior.

But while Plato defies chronology in some points he cannot defy it in all, and reference to the events of his lifetime must be regarded as giving a certain limit for the composition, if not for the dramatic scene. So the well known reference to the διοικισμός of Mantinea, in *Symp.* 193 A, proves that the *Sympos.* was not composed before 385, and gives us an important *terminus post quem* and *ante quem* for the other dialogues. Ritter puts (*Parmenides*), *Theaet.*, *Phaedrus*, *Sophistes*, *Politic.*, *Philebus*, *Critias*, *Laws* after the *Symp.*—all the rest, except perhaps *Lysis* and *Menexenus*, before. Reserving for a more detailed discussion *Phaedrus* and *Euthydemus*—whose position is made questionable by the apparent conflict of the statistical method with the allusions in the dialogues themselves—we find in *Meno* (90 A) an allusion to the Theban Ismenias and his receiving a bribe, which puts the composition of that dialogue after 395. In *Menexenus* the history of Athens is followed down to the time of the peace of Antalkidas (387). *Theaetetus*, acc. to Rohde, contains (175 A) what seems to be an allusion to the Euagoras of Isokrates, and the date thus gained (after 374) is in keeping with the statistical results set forth by Ritter and others, although it creates some embarrassment as to the *Phaedrus*, which the language brings into close proximity with *Theaetetus*. If Plato, in accordance with a common, if not prevalent belief in antiquity, composed some of his dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates, the allusion to Sokrates' death in *Apology*, *Crito* and *Phaedo*, and to his trial in *Euthyphro*, *Gorgias*, and *Meno* would have some significance, and Ritter would put the just mentioned dialogues, together with *Menexenus* and *Symposium*, in the second division, all the rest of the first stage before the death of Sokrates, in

conformity with Stallbaum's view and, leaving out Hippias II and Cratylus, with Hermann's.

To hasten to R.'s summary of results, probable as well as certain. R. puts Laches, Hippias I and II, Charmides, Protagoras, Euthydemus, and Cratylus before 399. After the death of Sokrates Plato left Athens. How long he was gone we do not know. In a space of about 12 years, say to about 385, were written Apol., Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Meno, Phaedo, Menexenus, Symposium. In the interval between his departure from Athens and his return falls his first journey to Syracuse, undertaken, according to Ep. VII, which Ritter accepts as a good source, in his fortieth year, or about 387. Menexenus and Symposium were written after the journey. After the composition of the Symposium a change takes place in Plato's manner, as is seen in Theaetetus, Phaedrus and Republic, so that we must assume an interval of some years in which Plato did not write. The Phaedrus, therefore, cannot be pushed back beyond 375 even if we do not follow the indicia of the language and put it after the Theaetetus, which Ritter assigns to the neighborhood of 370. For the composition of the Republic the end of the eighties or the beginning of the seventies would give a probable date. In 367 the second voyage to Sicily makes a new section and sunders Sophistes from Theaetetus. In fact it is a question whether Sophistes was written before the third Sicilian voyage in the summer of 361. Sicilian affairs occupied so much of Plato's time before his return to Athens, in the summer of 360, that he could not have had much relish or leisure for writing. All the other works, then, of the third stadium of Platonic language, with the exception of the Sophistes, belong to the last stretch of Plato's life. These are Politicus, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias, and Laws.

Two problems remain, the position of Phaedrus,<sup>1</sup> and that of Euthydemus. Usener finds in Isokrates' speech against the Sophists (c. 390) a clear allusion to the Phaedrus. Nay, the very words are quoted. Ritter, however, turns this round, and agrees with Siebeck in supposing that Plato had Isokrates' speech before his eyes. As to the date, Siebeck puts the Phaedrus some ten years after 390. But one of the points made by Usener is that the criticism of the *λόγος ἐρωτικός* of Lysias in the Phaedrus could have been possible only at the time when Lysias's main work lay in the epideiktic direction. This would put the date of the Phaedrus 403 or 402. Blass, Att. Bereds. I, p. 382, does not agree with Usener and puts the date of the Phaedrus considerably later (erheblich später). If Lysias was to be criticised, only a speech on a general theme would serve, and Lysias himself would have considered an epideiktic composition to be of a higher order than a dikeianic speech. In 390, however, Lysias had long given up the epideiktic department, and the *λόγος ἐρωτικός* was more than twenty years old. But if, according to Siebeck, Plato waited ten years before replying to Isokrates, he might have waited twenty years before criticising Lysias, and in this way—not a very effective way—Ritter tries to bring Siebeck down with him to a later date than 380.

To be sure, every reader who approaches the Phaedrus with unbiassed mind will receive the impression that the lessons there conveyed are intended to

<sup>1</sup> According to Gomperz (see A. J. P. IX 379) the criteria of thought and the criteria of language coincide, except in the case of Phaedrus, an important exception, which can be explained only on the hypothesis that we have the Phaedrus in a second revised edition.

have their influence on the living Lysias, certainly on the living Isokrates.<sup>1</sup> But at the time Ritter assumes for the dialogue Lysias had been dead for years and years, and Isokrates was an old man, thoroughly set in his ways. But this is only a tribute to Plato's dramatic power. Protagoras was dead and Gorgias was dead when the dialogues which bear their names were composed. So was Prodikos, of whom Plato makes so striking a dramatic use in the Protagoras. But Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodikos are only types—only tendencies incorporate—and this is the case with Lysias and Isokrates. The question that rises in the course of this argumentation Ritter does not answer fully. Were the Lysiac and the Isokratean influences as potent thirty years afterwards, and the references as timely, as they would have been at Usener's date?<sup>2</sup> The praise bestowed on Isokrates at the close of the Phaedrus is a knotty question, which Ritter disposes of a trifle too cheerily. The praise is really no great praise, he maintains, because it serves only to make the censure sharper, but the comparison of Kallikles' praise of Sokrates in the Gorg. 485-486 B can hardly be considered a parallel, especially as in the Gorgias we have the dramatic setting to correct any false impression.<sup>3</sup>

There remains the Euthydemus. Here the question revolves about the famous *λογοποιός* of the final talk between Sokrates and Kriton. If the *ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάνν εἶναι σοφός, τούτων τις τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰς τὰ δικάστηρια δεινῶν*, if this man is Isokrates, then we shall have to give the Euthydemus a later date than that which is assigned to it by Ritter. The very details seem to be exactly suited to Isokrates, and the designation of this *λογοποιός* as a man who wrote speeches for others but never appeared in court himself, fits Isokrates so exactly that Spengel's identification seems to amount to a demonstration. But it is not a demonstration until it is proved that no other than Isokrates can possibly be meant. Theodoros of Byzantium has been set up by Sauppe, and Hermann inclines to Polykrates. Ritter himself points out resemblances between Kallikles in the Gorgias and the personage described by Kriton. Unfortunately Kallikles is a *ρήτωρ* and this man is a *λογοποιός*, and Ritter concludes by falling back on the last resort, that the *λογοποιός* is a fancy picture and no actual man.

Lysis, if genuine, is contemporaneous with the Symposium, or perhaps a little later, but Ritter cannot bring himself to accept its genuineness cordially, and his attitude towards the Parmenides is not over friendly. If it is by Plato, put it at least five years after the Symposium.

It has seemed to me that I should be doing a service by making a full summary of Ritter's treatment of the genuineness and chronology of the Platonic writings, partly because of the interest of the subject itself, partly because the

<sup>1</sup> Professor Campbell says (Bibl. Plat. p. 27): On the whole it seems to me that the Phaedrus must have been written 1) while the reputation of Lysias was still at its height and thus not long after his death; 2) while Isokrates was still comparatively young and not yet acknowledged to have shown other writers to be children in comparison; and 3) before the Republic was planned. The passage about oral teaching could hardly be composed at a time when Plato was preparing his great work, intended by him to influence opinion throughout the Hellenic world. To speak of this as *Ἀδώνιδος κήπος* would be too absurd.

<sup>2</sup> Susemihl, in the Jahrb. 1880 (p. 709), calls attention to the long survival of such memories. In the Ps. Dem. speech c. Neaeram, written after 343, Lysias is still called *ὁ σοφιστής* (221), and Isokrates could not outlive his early reputation of a *λογοποιός*, for which to be sure S. cites the disputed reference in Euthyd. 304 B and 305 E, besides Isokrates himself, 15, 31-42.

<sup>3</sup> Professor Campbell emphasizes 'the frank heartiness and manifest sincerity of the passage.

work invites the cooperation of American scholars. Americans have a strong native bent towards statistics, and in the case of philologists that bent is made more decided by the absence of apparatus. One can always become master of a critical text edition, and counting is not denied to any one. When it comes to inferences the danger begins, and Ritter has found and will find critics to question his conclusions. Even facts are not so easily caught as some fancy, and who that has taken out his grammatical butterfly-net has not been exposed to disappointment and mortification? But the limits of an ordinary review have already been transcended and there is no room for further remark or criticism.

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Ueber den zweiten Teil der Odyssee, von Dr. C. REICHERT. iv + 92 pp.  
Berlin, Mayer & Müller, 1889.

This is a dissertation to prove that Kirchhoff's "Fortsetzer" and "Bearbeiter" were one and the same (see A. J. P. VIII, p. 415). It also seeks to distinguish the composition of this "Redaktor" from the older material which he incorporated into his work. As compared with the results of Wilamowitz's or Seck's analyses, the conclusions of Reichert point to far less variety of source for our Odyssey, and far greater activity on the part of one compiler. The method of investigation is much more conservative and restrained than that of Wilamowitz and Seck, but still it produces many logical "kartenhäuser," or cumulative possibilities. The whole structure rests on the imperfect proof, in the first chapter, that the author of  $\nu$  185 ff. and  $\pi$  knew and used  $\kappa\mu$  and the Telemachy. Considering the slight proportion which our Iliad and Odyssey bear to the mass of epic poetry extant when they were compiled, the fact that one verse is more happily used in  $\kappa$  than in  $\nu$ , and that two hemistichs in  $\nu$  resemble two in  $\kappa$  enough to have been suggested by them, is by no means sufficient to prove  $\nu$  later than and indebted to  $\kappa$ . Much of the criticism of the quality of poetry in  $\nu$  which this first chapter contains, is far fetched. Until this first premise is greatly strengthened, the conclusions of the following chapters, so far as they depend upon those of the first, must be doubted.

Not to give these conclusions in detail, let it be here said merely that the investigation, like all those of the same class, carries dissection and analysis beyond all due bounds, and builds constructive theories of composition on too slight evidence. At the same time it is useful in sharpening the principles of Homeric interpretation, and in making it more clear that the Iliad and Odyssey are artificial elaborations of folk-song.

To arguments of the following sort we can never allow any force:  $\psi$  152 is possibly from  $\nu$  170, part of the adventure with Cyclops,  $\nu$  237 is from  $\iota$  273, also part of the adventure with Cyclops; *ergo*  $\psi$  152 and  $\nu$  237 are by the same author (p. 14). Or, the author of  $\nu$  borrows from  $\kappa$ ; the author of  $\sigma$  borrows from  $\kappa$ ; hence the author of  $\nu$  was the author of  $\sigma$  (p. 60). Nor can we allow subjective impressions of the relative poetical merit of passages to decide their parentage (pp. 18, 21, 27, etc.).

It makes the reading of the book very hard that the author uses "Redaktor" and "Dichter der Verwandlung" synonymously. The separate conclusions also might have been summarized and emphasized much better. The chapters follow each other in a rambling and desultory way. Nevertheless, after all criticism, the book is suggestive and will be fruitful.

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